Self-protection as a limit to strategic delegation in the context of global pollution problems by Heuson, Clemens
www.ssoar.info
Self-protection as a limit to strategic delegation in
the context of global pollution problems
Heuson, Clemens
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
Helmholtz-Zentrum für Umweltforschung - UFZ
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Heuson, C. (2013). Self-protection as a limit to strategic delegation in the context of global pollution problems. (UFZ
Discussion Papers, 18/2013). Leipzig: Helmholtz-Zentrum für Umweltforschung - UFZ. https://nbn-resolving.org/
urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-365417
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-SA Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Weitergebe unter gleichen
Bedingungen) zur Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den
CC-Lizenzen finden Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-SA Licence
(Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0
Publisher: 
Helmholtz-Zentrum für Umweltforschung GmbH - UFZ 
Permoserstr. 15 
04318 Leipzig           ISSN 1436-140X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UFZ Discussion Papers 
 
Department of Economics 
18/2013 
 
 
 
Self-protection as a limit to strategic delegation  
in the context of global pollution problems 
 
 
 
Clemens Heuson 
 
 
November 2013 
Self-protection as a limit to strategic delegation in the context of 
global pollution problems 
   Clemens Heuson∗ Department of Economics, Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research – UFZ, Permoser Str. 15, 04318 Leipzig, Germany       
ABSTRACT This paper analyses the outcome of non-cooperative national efforts in combatting global pollu-tion problems when governments are elected by their citizens. It is well-known that the latter tend to vote governments that are less ‘green’ than the median voter in order to commit to lower national mitigation efforts, which further increases the inefficiently high amount of global emis-sions. However, the present paper shows that the option of self-protection against environmen-tal damages, which has been invariably neglected in the relevant literature to date, alleviates or even completely offsets such strategic delegation and the related adverse effects.    
JEL Classification: C72, D72, H41, Q58 
 
 
 
Keywords: Strategic delegation, global pollution problems, self-protection, non-cooperative behav-
iour 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
∗ Tel.: +49-341-235-1743 E-mail address: clemens.heuson@ufz.de 
2 
 
1. Introduction  The solution of global pollution problems necessarily requires joint action. Otherwise, coun-tries do not take into account the negative externalities their emissions impose on the rest of the world. Such non-cooperative outcome is typically characterised by an inefficiently high level of global emissions (Buchholz et al. 2005). However, since mitigation of emissions is a global public good and thus provides free-riding incentives, international environmental agreements – if im-plemented at all – hardly go beyond non-cooperative mitigation efforts (Barrett 1994). Considering that national governments are not exogenously given, but rather elected by het-erogeneous citizens, a number of recent studies suggests that even more pessimism is indicated (Siqueira 2003; Buchholz et al. 2005). These studies argue that voters have an incentive to elect representatives with weaker environmental preferences compared to the median voter. Through such strategic delegation, a country commits itself to a lower contribution to the global public good of mitigation, thus shifting the burden of reaching a higher environmental quality to the rest of the world. For obvious reasons, this leads to a further increase in global emissions relatively to the non-cooperative equilibrium with exogenously given governments. To date, the literature on strategic delegation has invariably abstracted from the possibility of self-protection against environmental damages. However, as can be seen from the prime exam-ple of global pollution problems, the emission of greenhouse gases, this might mean a severe qualification of results. Here, self-protection, i.e., adaptation to climate change, currently under-goes a significant boost on the agenda of climate policy (Berg 2012). Against this backdrop, the present paper re-evaluates the role of strategic delegation in non-cooperative international environmental policy whilst taking into account self-protection. More precisely, we consider a two-country setup with three stages. In the first stage, the citizens of either country elect their respective government following the median voter approach. In stage two, governments fix the domestic emission level before they engage in self-protection (stage 3).1 The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 deter-mines the subgame-perfect equilibrium. Section 4 reveals the role of self-protection as a limit to strategic delegation. Section 5 provides some concluding remarks on the associated conse-quences in terms of global efficiency.  
2. The model  Following much of the literature (e.g. Hoel 1991; Ebert and Welsch 2012), we employ a two-country setup, whereas uppercase (lowercase) letters denote functions and variables of the home (foreign) country.2 Home’s emissions 𝐸, serving as an essential input for production, yield national economic benefits equal to the sum of consumers’ and producers’ surplus 𝐵(𝐸) with usual properties 𝐵𝐸 > 0, 𝐵𝐸𝐸 < 0. On the contrary, emissions – no matter what origin – harm the ecological system at home and abroad in equal manner. Besides reducing domestic emissions, which imposes a positive external effect on its neighbour and thus constitutes a global public good, home can alleviate its environmental damages through expenditures for self-protective measures 𝐴.3 We follow the prevalent view in the literature that self-protection – contrary to 
                                                          1 For a motivation of this specific sequence of decisions see Ebert and Welsch (2012) and Section 3. 2 In the remainder of this paper, only the formulas referring to the home country are depicted for the sake of concise-ness. Those for the foreign country apply in an analogous manner. 3 Since self-protection usually comprises a variety of heterogeneous measures that cannot be scaled by a single physi-cal unit, it is captured in terms of expenditures within our model framework (see Ebert and Welsch 2012). 
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mitigation of emissions – features private good characteristics since it largely provides national benefits only (see e.g. Zehaie 2009). This gives rise to home’s damage cost function 𝐷(𝐸 + 𝑒,𝐴) with usual properties 𝐷𝐸 = 𝐷𝑒 > 0, 𝐷𝐸𝐸 > 0, 𝐷𝐴 < 0, 𝐷𝐴𝐴 > 0, 𝐷𝐸𝐴 = 𝐷𝐴𝐸 < 0 (see e.g. Ebert and Welsch 2012).4 Home is populated by a continuum of individuals of mass 1, indexed by 𝐼. Assume that all in-dividuals have identical stakes in the benefits 𝐵(𝐸) and contribute to self-protection expendi-tures in equal measure. However, each individual attaches a different weight to environmental damages,5 reflected by the parameter 𝜃𝐼, which is continuously distributed on the bounded in-terval [0;𝜃𝑀𝐴𝑋] (see Buchholz et al. 2005). Thus, 𝐼’s net benefit, which similarly represents the home country’s welfare with damage costs weighted by 𝜃𝐼, reads  
𝑊𝐼(𝐸, 𝑒,𝐴) = 𝐵(𝐸) − 𝜃𝐼𝐷(𝐸 + 𝑒,𝐴) − 𝐴.             (1)  Environmental policy is decided by an elected government or representative, respectively. Both the electorate and pool of potential representatives are given by the sum of all the country’s in-habitants. Following Buchholz et al. (2005), we assume that the representative in power, denot-ed by index 𝐺, can directly determine the domestic levels of emissions and expenditures for self-protection. Thus, environmental policy maximises her payoff (1) and is fully characterised by her preference parameter 𝜃𝐺. The stylised election process follows a simple majority rule, im-plying that the choice of the policy maker is up to the median voter (Roelfsema 2007). 
 
3. Subgame-perfect equilibrium  In case of non-cooperative behaviour, the sequence of decisions with respect to emissions and self-protection matters (Zehaie 2009). Following Ebert and Welsch (2012), we assume that emissions are essential for economic activity and hence cannot be postponed after self-protective measures have been employed. It will be seen that, within our framework, fixing emissions before self-protection is perfectly equivalent to simultaneous decision making. How-ever, for analytical convenience, we refer to the sequential choice and thus consider the three-stage game described in Section 1 (Stage 1: strategic voting – Stage 2: emission level – Stage 3: self-protection level). Employing backwards induction, we start out with solving Stage 3. Home’s policy maker max-imises domestic welfare with respect to 𝐴, i.e. max𝐴𝑊𝐺(𝐸, 𝑒,𝐴) = 𝐵(𝐸)− 𝜃𝐺𝐷(𝐸 + 𝑒,𝐴) − 𝐴, which requires bringing in line marginal benefits in terms of reduced damage costs and marginal costs:  
−𝜃𝐺𝐷𝐴 − 1 = 0,               (2)  Since (2) does not depend on the neighbour’s decision, representatives choose adaptation in dominant strategies, given the global emission level and their environmental preferences de-termined at the previous stages, i.e., 𝐴(𝐸 + 𝑒,𝜃𝐺), 𝑎(𝐸 + 𝑒,𝜃𝑔). Simple comparative statics show that ‘greener’ policy makers choose higher levels of self-protection, i.e. 𝜕𝐴 𝜕𝜃𝐺⁄ > 0, 𝜕𝑎 𝜕𝜃𝑔⁄ >0. Moreover, increased emission levels – no matter what origin – induce a compensation of high-
                                                          4 The latter property implies that mitigation of emissions and self-protection are substitutes (rather than comple-ments) in alleviating environmental damages, which reflects the prevalent view in the literature (see e.g. Pittel and Rübbelke 2013). 5 This may be for the reason that damages actually differ among individuals and/or the latter feature varying envi-ronmental preferences.  
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er damages through augmented self-protective efforts, i.e. 𝜕𝐴 𝜕𝐸⁄ = 𝜕𝐴 𝜕𝑒⁄ > 0, 𝜕𝑎 𝜕𝐸⁄ =
𝜕𝑎 𝜕𝑒⁄ > 0.6 In Stage 2, home’s optimal emission level solves max𝐸 𝑊𝐺�𝐸, 𝑒,𝐴(𝐸 + 𝑒,𝜃𝐺)�; i.e. while fixing 
𝐸, home anticipates the respective impact on self-protection in Stage 3. Taking account of (2), the related first-order condition states that marginal benefits and national7 marginal damage costs related to an increase in 𝐸 have to be balanced  
𝐵𝐸 − 𝜃
𝐺𝐷𝐸 = 0.8                  (3)  From this immediately follows that home and foreign emissions are strategic substitutes, i.e., 
𝑑𝐸 𝑑𝑒⁄ < 0. Moreover, augmented environmental preferences of the home country’s govern-ment lead to a decrease in home’s equilibrium emission level 𝐸(𝜃𝐺 ,𝜃𝑔) and thus to an increase in the foreign level 𝑒(𝜃𝐺 ,𝜃𝑔), i.e., 𝜕𝐸 𝜕𝜃𝐺 < 0⁄ , 𝜕𝑒 𝜕𝜃𝐺 > 0⁄ . Since the former effect dominates the latter, the overall impact on global emissions is negative, i.e., 𝜕(𝐸 + 𝑒) 𝜕𝜃𝐺 < 0⁄ .9 In Stage 1, the median voter chooses the policy maker such that her pay-off is maximised, giv-en the equilibrium outcome of the previous stages: max𝜃𝐺 𝑊𝑀(𝜃𝐺 ,𝜃𝑔) = 𝐵�𝐸(𝜃𝐺 ,𝜃𝑔)� −
𝜃𝑀𝐷�𝐸(𝜃𝐺 ,𝜃𝑔) + 𝑒(𝜃𝐺 ,𝜃𝑔),𝐴(𝐸(𝜃𝐺 ,𝜃𝑔) + 𝑒(𝜃𝐺 ,𝜃𝑔),𝜃𝐺)� −  𝐴(𝐸(𝜃𝐺 ,𝜃𝑔) + 𝑒(𝜃𝐺 ,𝜃𝑔),𝜃𝐺). The respective first-order condition highlights that choosing a slightly greener candidate comes along with a marginal decrease (increase) in emissions (self-protection)10 and thus has an am-biguous overall impact in terms of welfare:  
𝐵𝐸
𝜕𝐸
𝜕𝜃𝐺���
<0
−�𝐴𝐸
𝜕(𝐸+𝑒)
𝜕𝜃𝐺
+
𝜕𝐴
𝜕𝜃𝐺
������������
<0
−𝜃𝑀 �𝐷𝐸
𝜕(𝐸+𝑒)
𝜕𝜃𝐺
+ 𝐷𝐴�𝐴𝐸𝜕(𝐸+𝑒)𝜕𝜃𝐺 + 𝜕𝐴𝜕𝜃𝐺���������������������������
>0
= 0          (4)  
 On the one hand, it causes an increase in costs in terms of decreased benefits and increased ex-penditures for self-protection; on the other hand, it reduces damage costs. The subgame-perfect equilibrium is characterised by the selected candidates 𝜃�𝐺(𝜃𝑀,𝜃𝑚), 𝜃�𝑔(𝜃𝑀,𝜃𝑚).11 Clearly, in-creased environmental preferences of the home’s median voter induce her to select a greener candidate, i.e., 𝜕𝜃�𝐺 𝜕⁄ 𝜃𝑀 > 0, whereas the respective impact on the selected foreign candidate is ambiguous, i.e., the sign of 𝜕𝜃�𝑔 𝜕⁄ 𝜃𝑀 is indeterminate.12  
4. Self-protection as a limit to strategic delegation  According to the prevalent view in the literature, the median voter empowers a representa-tive with weaker environmental preferences compared to herself (𝜃�𝐺 < 𝜃𝑀) in order to commit to a lower contribution to the global public good of mitigation and hence to increase her pay-off (Siqueira 2003; Buchholz et al. 2005). However, the respective studies invariably neglect the 
                                                          6 In other words, mitigation serves as a substitute to self-protection in reducing a country’s damage costs. 7 Due to non-cooperative behaviour, countries neglect their emissions’ detrimental impact on the respective neigh-bour, leading to the well-known result of an inefficiently high level of global emissions (see e.g. Cornes and Sandler 1996). The level of self-protection is inefficiently high as well (see e.g. Zehaie 2009). 8 Obviously, (2) and (3) perfectly correspond to the first-order conditions in case of simultaneous decision making on emissions and self-protection. Thus, similarly to Zehaie (2009), there is no difference between fixing (𝐸, 𝑒) before or simultaneously with (𝐴, 𝑎) in our framework. 9 For the proof see Appendix 1. 10 The increase in self-protection grounds on the assumption that 𝜃𝐺 ’s direct impact on 𝐴, 𝜕𝐴 𝜕𝜃𝐺⁄ >0, outweighs its indirect impact via the global emission level, 𝐴𝐸(𝜕(𝐸 + 𝑒) 𝜕𝜃𝐺⁄ ) < 0. 11 In what follows, “~” marks the functions and variables occurring in the subgame-perfect equilibrium. 12 For the proof and explanation see Appendix 2. 
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option of self-protection. For scrutinizing the latter’s impact in terms of strategic voting, solve (4) for 𝜃𝑀 𝜃�𝐺⁄ , having regard to (2) and (3):  
𝜃𝑀
𝜃�𝐺
= 𝐵𝐸 𝜕𝐸𝜕𝜃𝐺−�𝐴𝐸𝜕(𝐸+𝑒)𝜕𝜃𝐺 + 𝜕𝐴𝜕𝜃𝐺�
𝐵𝐸
𝜕(𝐸+𝑒)
𝜕𝜃𝐺
−�𝐴𝐸
𝜕(𝐸+𝑒)
𝜕𝜃𝐺
+
𝜕𝐴
𝜕𝜃𝐺
�
=: 𝛼−𝛽
𝛾−𝛽
,              (5)  where 𝛼 ≔ 𝐵𝐸 𝜕𝐸𝜕𝜃𝐺 < 0, 𝛽 ≔ 𝐴𝐸𝜕(𝐸+𝑒)𝜕𝜃𝐺 + 𝜕𝐴𝜕𝜃𝐺 > 0, 𝛾 ≔ 𝐵𝐸 𝜕(𝐸+𝑒)𝜕𝜃𝐺 < 0. From this immediately follows  
Proposition 1. Suppose, within a non-cooperative setting, measures of self-protection are availa-
ble as an additional option to tackle global pollution problems besides mitigation of emissions. 
(i) Countries still engage in strategic delegation, i.e. median voters empower candidates with 
weaker environmental preferences compared to themselves, i.e., 𝜃𝑀 > 𝜃�𝐺 , 𝜃𝑚 > 𝜃�𝑔. 
(ii) However, self-protection limits the extent of strategic delegation, i.e. the gap between 𝜃𝑀,𝜃�𝐺  
and 𝜃𝑚,𝜃�𝑔, respectively, shrinks compared to case where countries solely rely on mitigation.  
Proof. (i): |𝜕𝐸 𝜕⁄ 𝜃𝐺| > |𝜕(𝐸 + 𝑒) 𝜕⁄ 𝜃𝐺| (see Section 3) implies |𝛼| > |𝛾| and thus 𝜃𝑀 > 𝜃�𝐺. (ii): In case without self-protection, 𝛽 = 0. Since 𝜕�𝜃𝑀 𝜃�𝐺⁄ � 𝜕𝛽⁄ < 0, the option of self-protection weakens the extent of strategic delegation. Analogous reasoning for the foreign country. ∎  (i) is obvious since allowing for self-protection does not change the fact that strategic delegation is the only device for the countries to commit to a lower mitigation effort. However, self-protection makes strategic delegation less attractive for the following reason (ii). From the sin-gle country’s and median voter’s isolated view, respectively, strategic delegation distorts both the optimal extent of emissions and self-protection: since 𝜃𝑀 > 𝜃�𝐺(𝜃𝑀 ,𝜃𝑚) and 𝜕𝐸 𝜕𝜃𝐺 < 0⁄ , 
𝜕𝐴 𝜕𝜃𝐺⁄ > 0, emissions (expenditures for self-protection) are inefficiently high (low). Contrary to the increase in emissions, which forces the neighbour to raise its contribution to the global public good of mitigation, countries do not profit from the associated downturn in self-protection. That is because the latter is a purely private good and thus offers no scope for benefi-cial manipulation of the neighbour’s decision. For this reason, self-protection reduces the profit-ability of choosing a candidate with weaker environmental preferences compared to the median voter. As a direct consequence, state  
Corollary 1. In case self-protection responds very sensitively to changes in environmental prefer-
ences compared to emissions, strategic delegation vanishes, i.e., 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝛽→∞
𝛼−𝛽
𝛾−𝛽
= 1 ⇔ 𝜃𝑀 = 𝜃�𝐺.  As can be seen from the comparative statics with respect to (2) and (3), this constellation applies when self-protection features a considerable higher effectiveness in reducing damage costs compared to mitigation of emissions.13 In that case, the cost of strategic delegation concerning the distortion of self-protection outweighs the gain from the associated increase in domestic emissions.   
 
 
 
                                                          13 The proof of this statement is straightforward and can be obtained from the author upon request. 
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5. Conclusion  Many global pollution problems, such as anthropogenic climate change, either suffer from the sheer absence of joint action or from unambitious international agreements that hardly go be-yond non-cooperative mitigation efforts. Such efforts are well-known to be inefficiently low from the global perspective. This outcome even deteriorates when it is taken into account that coun-tries might strategically delegate environmental policy to representatives with weaker environ-mental preferences compared to the median voter in order to commit to higher emission levels. However, the present paper shows that this pessimistic view has to be put into context to some extent. This is for the reason that the option of self-protection against environmental damages, which has been neglected throughout the respective literature so far, restricts the incentives for strategic delegation. The latter distorts both the decision with respect to emissions and self-protection from the single country’s view. While the former distortion entails benefits for either country because it forces the respective neighbour to boost its contribution to the global public good of mitigation, distorting the decision on the private good of self-protection comes along with a pure cost. Consequently, self-protection serves as a limit to strategic delegation and thus improves global efficiency due to the associated downturn in total emissions.14 Nevertheless, the latter remain inefficiently high since self-protection can at best offset (but not overcompensate) strategic delegation, for what reason global emissions cannot fall below the non-cooperative level.   
Appendix 1: Comparative statics – (𝐸, 𝑒) with respect to (𝜃𝐺 ,𝜃𝑔)  Home and foreign emissions respond to a marginal increase in the policy makers’ environ-mental preferences as follows:  
�
𝜕𝐸
𝜕𝜃𝐺
𝜕𝐸
𝜕𝜃𝑔
𝜕𝑒
𝜕𝜃𝐺
𝜕𝑒
𝜕𝜃𝑔
� = − 1
det
�
𝑤𝑒𝑒
𝑔 −𝑊𝐸𝑒
𝐺
−𝑤𝑒𝐸
𝑔 𝑊𝐸𝐸
𝐺 ��
𝑊𝐸𝜃𝐺
𝐺 𝑊𝐸𝜃𝑔
𝐺
𝑤
𝑒𝜃𝐺
𝑔 𝑤𝑒𝜃𝑔
𝑔 �,                   (A1.1)  where det denotes the determinant of the Hessian which origins from the countries’ minimisa-tion problem in terms of (𝐸, 𝑒). Since det > 0 holds for a unique and stable Nash equilibrium in emissions (Tirole 1988), calculating (A1.1) yields  
𝜕𝐸
𝜕𝜃𝐺
= − 1
det
(𝑏𝑒𝑒 − 𝜃𝑔𝑑𝑒𝑒)(−𝐷𝐸) < 0, 𝜕𝐸𝜕𝜃𝑔 = − 1det 𝜃𝐺𝐷𝐸𝑒(−𝑑𝑒) > 0, 
𝜕𝑒
𝜕𝜃𝐺
= − 1
det
𝜃𝑔𝑑𝑒𝐸(−𝐷𝐸) > 0, 𝜕𝑒𝜕𝜃𝑔 = − 1det (𝐵𝐸𝐸 − 𝜃𝐺𝐷𝐸𝐸)(−𝑑𝑒) < 0,                     (A1.2) 
𝜕(𝐸+𝑒)
𝜕𝜃𝐺
= 1
det
𝑏𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐸 < 0, 𝜕(𝐸+𝑒)𝜕𝜃𝑔 = 1det 𝐵𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑒 < 0.  
 
 
                                                          14 A full analysis of the self-protection option’s impact on global efficiency would require assessing – besides the im-pact on global emissions – the welfare effects of introducing self-protection itself. This effect is yet ambiguous. On the hand, introducing an additional control variable generally allows for a higher level of global welfare. On the other hand, the level of self-protection is distorted. An explicit trade-off of these effects cannot be carried out given the general form of the model employed. 
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Appendix 2: Comparative statics – �𝜃�𝐺 ,𝜃�𝑔� with respect to 𝜃𝑀  Analogously to Appendix 1, the selected candidate’s environmental preferences respond to a marginal increase in those of the median voter as follows:  
�
𝜕𝜃�𝐺
𝜕𝜃𝑀
𝜕𝜃�𝐺
𝜕𝜃𝑚
𝜕𝜃�𝑔
𝜕𝜃𝑀
𝜕𝜃�𝑔
𝜕𝜃𝑚
� = − 1
det
�
𝑤𝜃𝑔𝜃𝑔
𝑚 −𝑊𝜃𝐺𝜃𝑔
𝑀
−𝑤𝜃𝑔𝜃𝐺
𝑚 𝑊𝜃𝐺𝜃𝐺
𝑀 ��
𝑊𝜃𝐺𝜃𝑀
𝑀 𝑊𝜃𝐺𝜃𝑚
𝑀
𝑤𝜃𝑔𝜃𝑀
𝑚 𝑤𝜃𝑔𝜃𝑚
𝑚 �,                  (A2.1)  where det > 0 denotes the determinant of the Hessian which origins from the countries’ mini-misation problem in terms of (𝜃𝐺 ,𝜃𝑔). As second-order conditions require 𝑊𝜃𝐺𝜃𝐺𝑀 ,𝑤𝜃𝑔𝜃𝑔𝑚 < 0, calculating (A2.1) yields for home (analogously for foreign):  
𝜕𝜃�𝐺
𝜕𝜃𝑀
=  − 1
det
𝑤𝜃𝑔𝜃𝑔
𝑚 �−�𝐷𝐸
𝜕(𝐸+𝑒)
𝜕𝜃𝐺
+ 𝐷𝐴 �𝐴𝐸 𝜕(𝐸+𝑒)𝜕𝜃𝐺 + 𝜕𝐴𝜕𝜃𝐺��� > 0,  𝜕𝜃�𝐺
𝜕𝜃𝑚
=  − 1
det
�−𝑊𝜃𝐺𝜃𝑔
𝑀 �(−𝑑𝑒)�−�𝑑𝑒 𝜕(𝐸+𝑒)𝜕𝜃𝑔 + 𝑑𝑎 �𝑎𝑒 𝜕(𝐸+𝑒)𝜕𝜃𝑔 + 𝜕𝑎𝜕𝜃𝑔���                 (A2.2) 
�
> 0 if 𝑊𝜃𝐺𝜃𝑔𝑀 > 0 ⇔ 𝜕𝜃𝐺 𝜕𝜃𝑔 > 0 ⇔ 𝜃𝑀 < 𝜃�𝑀⁄= 0 if 𝑊𝜃𝐺𝜃𝑔𝑀 = 0 ⇔ 𝜕𝜃𝐺 𝜕𝜃𝑔 = 0 ⇔ 𝜃𝑀 = 𝜃�𝑀⁄< 0 if 𝑊𝜃𝐺𝜃𝑔𝑀 < 0 ⇔ 𝜕𝜃𝐺 𝜕𝜃𝑔 < 0 ⇔ 𝜃𝑀 > 𝜃�𝑀⁄ .  A less green foreign government basically forces home to reduce emissions for compensating the increased damages. Given the median voter’s environmental preferences are relatively weak, i.e. 
𝜃𝑀 < 𝜃�𝑀, home responds by empowering a less green policy maker in order to maintain the emission level and associated benefits. Analogous reasoning for the reverse case �𝜃𝑀 > 𝜃�𝑀�.  
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